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COMMENTARY ON PANEL II: STATE AID 
AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
William F. Kroener, III* 
he presentations by Professors Cavalier and Reiss, and by Dr. Ru-
giero, cover a wide range of forms of state aid and intervention in 
the European Union and in the United States. It is challenging to pull 
together particular themes. The presentations deal specifically with state 
aid and structural reform in France, regulatory and supervisory concerns 
and possible reform of prudential supervision in the EU, and the long-
range strategic pre-crisis intervention in U.S. Federal housing markets by 
the U.S. government as a precursor to current problems. 
In considering the totality of these presentations, I would suggest that 
there is little indication that the French or EU approaches provide a new 
paradigm for possible modification of the U.S. regulatory model. Profes-
sor Cavalier’s paper makes clear that intervention in France is of an ex-
treme central national character. An important element of the French ap-
proach was to provide a direct state guarantee of the fundraising without 
the need for additional legislation. The detailed French state intervention 
described by Professor Cavalier, the more general European approach 
presented by Dr. Rugiero and the use of the instrumentalities of the U.S. 
housing agencies—Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae—as described by Pro-
fessor Reiss do not suggest common themes but instead a set of ad hoc 
approaches informed by national history, culture and predispositions. In 
short, the situation is quite different for each country and from circums-
tance to circumstance. 
Professor Cavalier outlines several instrumental steps in France. In 
contrast to the U.S. intervention, French intervention seems to be more 
structural. This is to be expected from the French state, which has a di-
rect and more extensive continuing involvement than is the case in the 
U.S. The French state, unlike the U.S., established specialized single 
purpose vehicles (SPV’s) for recapitalization and short-term funding 
matter, with state guarantees for both. Further, Professor Cavalier sug-
gests a permanent role for the French government. This diverges from 
the U.S. where the effort is to intervene only temporarily, tweak and im-
prove the regulatory system, and then withdraw. 
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Two similarities with the U.S. noted by Dr. Rugiero are the need for 
improved prudential supervision and a broadened scope to encompass 
near financial institutions, however characterized. Dr. Rugiero’s presen-
tation focuses on the EU approach. He suggests that as a result of the 
economic dislocations there will be a focus in Europe on more extensive 
prudential regulation and greater transparency than has heretofore been 
the case. Dr. Rugiero also suggests that full implementation of fair value 
accounting may be too extreme. There is, of course, some similarity in 
this to U.S. concerns. Dr. Rugiero foresees measures to support greater 
independence and specific accountability as well as transparency. Surpri-
singly, Professor Rugiero also sees a role for legal actions in the E.U, so 
that the EU. would be moving more toward the U.S. situation. Whether 
this is truly the case, remains to be seen. 
The presentation of Professor Reiss, by contrast, is directed at a long 
term aspect of U.S. federal housing policy. He suggests that U.S. housing 
policy headed off track and was a significant component of the crisis in 
the U.S. By implication, perhaps, one can conclude that this U.S. housing 
policy contributed to the seriousness of the financial crisis in the U.S. as 
compared to, for example, the French and EU experiences. Professor 
Reiss focused on policies of the U.S. that were not in response to the cri-
sis but that were the very creation of the crisis. It suggests, at least in 
part, the important local differences in how the financial crisis develops 
and will play out. 
In assessing these diverse presentations, it is apparent that although 
there is similarity in the rapidity of the responses, and the common 
themes of greater prudential supervision and wider scope to cover broad-
er types of financial intermediaries, there are overall very considerable 
differences in the strategy and details. It is noteworthy that there may be 
a move in the EU toward more centralized regulation, but it does not ap-
pear that the U.S. will replicate this. In conclusion, these presentations 
are instructive in showing different approaches and in indicating that new 
paradigms for financial regulation in the EU are likely to be quite sepa-
rate and without detailed similarities to U.S. regulatory changes. 
 
